Branding an Aggressor: The Commonwealth, the United Nations and Chinese Intervention in the Korean War, November 1950–January 1951 by Barnes, Robert
 1 
BRANDING AN AGGRESSOR: 
THE COMMONWEALTH, THE UNITED NATIONS AND CHINESE 
INTERVENTION IN THE KOREAN WAR,  
NOVEMBER 1950-JANUARY 1951 
Robert Barnes 
 
Abstract: The crisis following China’s intervention in the Korean War 
led to a significant rift between the United States and the 
Commonwealth at the United Nations. This article examines the 
conditions under which the Commonwealth became united and was 
able to directly influence UN decision-making, concluding that, when 
united, the Commonwealth could not easily be ignored by Washington, 
and thereby acted as an agent of constraint upon the Western 
superpower. 
                                                     
 
China’s intervention in the Korean War in November 1950 precipitated the 
biggest crisis of the early Cold War period. Because of its importance, historians 
have lavished enormous attention on both the Truman Administration’s political 
and military responses and on the diplomatic manoeuvring that occurred inside 
the United Nations (UN).1 But they have largely overlooked the role played by the 
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Commonwealth.2 This is a significant gap, for during this crisis the 
Commonwealth not only challenged US hegemony at the world organisation but 
also directly influenced UN actions. Essential to the Commonwealth’s success 
was the unity of its members. This article argues that Commonwealth unity 
occurred when the risk of a global conflict was at its greatest, when key 
Commonwealth personalities were prepared to exercise their influence, when 
coincidence brought the Commonwealth members together, and when the U.S. 
Government was willing to bow to Commonwealth pressure. After these 
conditions were removed, the Commonwealth members put their other allegiances 
ahead of Commonwealth loyalty. Crucially, no single Commonwealth country, 
not even the UK, had sufficient influence to constrain US policy, but as a unit the 
Commonwealth wielded considerable moral authority, not to mention influence in 
Washington. 
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The British Commonwealth and the United Nations before Chinese 
Intervention 
Before the Singapore Declaration of 1971 the Commonwealth had neither a 
formal organisational structure nor a set of unifying principles.3  It remained 
largely defined by its founding document, the 1931 Statute of Westminster, which 
effectively established the legislative independence and equality of the then six 
Dominions—Australia, Canada, the Irish Free State, Newfoundland, New 
Zealand, and the Union of South Africa—who became known as the ‘Old’ 
Commonwealth members. The Statute also defined the Commonwealth as being, 
‘a free association…united by common allegiance to the Crown’. From the outset, 
therefore, the Commonwealth was a loosely-defined intergovernmental 
organisation of independent states united by a shared Head of State. The only 
official contact its members had with each other beyond normal diplomatic 
channels were at sporadic meetings on specific issues and roughly bi-annual 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conferences held in London in which common 
problems were dealt with informally.  
The Second World War undoubtedly marked the pinnacle of 
Commonwealth cooperation. Although Britain’s inability to offer adequate 
protection led to periodic spats, for the most part all the Commonwealth members, 
with the exception of Ireland, united against the dire threat posed by Axis Powers, 
and London became the focal point of wartime planning. But the post-war world 
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soon proved more complex. The composition of the organisation expanded with 
India, Pakistan and Ceylon4 accepting Commonwealth membership when they 
gained independence.5 These states became known as the ‘New’ Commonwealth 
members. Then in 1949 two members left the Commonwealth. Newfoundland 
joined Canada while Ireland became a republic, a path that India seemed likely to 
follow. But India was too important to lose. And so, rather than accepting its 
departure when it became a republic, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers agreed 
on the London Declaration. This allowed members who simply recognized the 
British Sovereign as Head of the Commonwealth, while also dropping the word 
‘British’ from the organization’s title. These actions demonstrated the flexibility 
of the Old Commonwealth members, particularly the UK, not to mention their 
strong desire to retain close relations with the new partners. 
Still, the importance of the Commonwealth to each of its members 
depended greatly on their foreign-policy priorities. The British Labour 
Government was not overly sentimental towards the Empire. But Prime Minister 
Clement Attlee, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations Patrick Gordon-Walker did realise that a united 
Commonwealth helped to perpetuate Britain’s Great Power status, despite 
growing indications of post-war decline. Moreover, the British Government hoped 
that by maintaining close relations with the New Commonwealth members, 
especially India, it could influence events in the emerging Third World and help 
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prevent the spread of communism in Asia. Bevin, though, was wary of using the 
Commonwealth as a counter-weight to American influence. His focus was on 
securing US aid and military support in Europe.  
After Britain, Australia and New Zealand were the most emotionally 
attached members of the Commonwealth. The conservative Australian and New 
Zealand Prime Ministers, Robert Menzies and Sidney Holland, were both fervent 
Anglophiles and looked to the UK to provide leadership. Yet Menzies and 
Holland disliked the admission of the non-white Commonwealth members and 
their respective Ministers for External Affairs, Percy Spender and Frederick 
Doidge, placed greater emphasis on courting American support for a Pacific 
security pact than Commonwealth loyalty. In contrast, Canada and South Africa 
displayed much greater independence from Britain. Canada had its own ‘special’ 
relationship with the United States, while its Francophone population, including 
Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, had few emotional ties to the Empire. Pearson, 
a true internationalist, also thought the Commonwealth anachronistic but still 
maintained close relations with his Commonwealth colleagues, both Old and 
New. Meanwhile, the South African Government of Daniel Malan, pursuing a 
policy of Afrikaner nationalism and racial segregation, had little desire to promote 
the multi-ethnic British Commonwealth.  
After independence, the governing elites in India and Pakistan retained 
close cultural and personal ties with Britain and above all respected the British 
democratic tradition. Their economies also remained inextricably connected to the 
other Commonwealth members, particularly the UK. Politically, the New 
Commonwealth governments, especially was hopeful that the Commonwealth 
 6 
could be used to counter-balance US dominance of the non-Communist world. 
Ironically, India and Pakistan also used Commonwealth membership as a way of 
checking each other’s global influence. With Kashmir a constant threat to regional 
stability, Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan hoped that the Commonwealth could 
provide a forum both for building bridges and for keeping an eye on each other. 
The Commonwealth’s role at the UN inevitably reflected the views of its 
individual members towards the world organisation. Britain’s initial hopes for the 
UN had evaporated with the breakdown of the wartime Grand Alliance. The 
Attlee government, therefore, was generally content to follow the US lead at the 
UN, although some debates there had strained Anglo-American relations, most 
notably the initial wrangling over Palestine. By 1950, the only significant 
difference between London and Washington revolved around the former’s desire 
to maintain the support of the neutral members whenever possible. The 
Australian, New Zealand and South African governments, for their parts, had little 
faith in the UN and preferred to remain quiet and support the Anglo-American 
position. The Canadian Government, however, felt that as a Middle Power 
Canada could play a useful mediatory role at the UN. Yet Canada always 
supported the American position when push came to shove.6 
The Indian position was very different. Nehru, much to the irritation of the 
Americans, was convinced that the world organisation could be utilised to 
reconcile Cold War issues. As a result India styled itself as the leader of the Arab-
Asian ‘neutral’ bloc, albeit one that always kept a wary eye on Pakistan.  
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Inside the UN, then, while the Heads of the Commonwealth delegations met 
informally to discuss policy, the Old and New Commonwealth members rarely 
acted as a single unit. Significantly, a partial exception came at the very start of 
the Korean War. In the wake of North Korea’s sudden and brazen invasion, all the 
Commonwealth members endorsed a US-sponsored Security Council resolution 
condemning North Korea and calling for the withdrawal of its forces north of the 
38th parallel.  
But beyond this, the Commonwealth states soon followed different paths, 
even during the period of great military uncertainty at the start of the Korean War 
in which a North Korean conquest of the peninsula was a very real possibility. In 
the Security Council India, the only Commonwealth member represented except 
the UK, refused to vote on the second US-sponsored resolution calling for the 
members of the UN to furnish such assistance to South Korea necessary to repel 
the North Korean armed attack and restore international peace and security. It was 
only after intense British pressure that Nehru agreed to “accept” the resolution as 
a natural progression of the UN action.7 Still, the Indian Prime Minister refused to 
sanction the British-sponsored but American-authored third resolution that placed 
the U.S. Government in control of the Unified Command in Korea—a resolution 
that transferred the Security Council’s powers of military coordination to 
Washington.  
On the other hand, the Old Commonwealth members rallied behind US 
leadership in the UN, particularly the British who were closely consulted by the 
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Truman administration. These Commonwealth governments also talked amongst 
themselves regarding what contributions they could make to the UN action. 
Within days these governments pledged to provide military assistance to the UN 
action, despite their reluctance to commit ground forces in light of their domestic 
and global defensive commitments. Moreover, after the rapid reversal in military 
fortunes following UN Commander General Douglas MacArthur’s successful 
counterattack at Inchon, the older members supported a resolution in the General 
Assembly, jointly sponsored by the USA and UK, which effectively permitted the 
UN Command to unify the peninsula by force. It was a position anathema to the 
Indians. In Beijing, the Indian ambassador, Sardar K. M. Panikkar, had repeatedly 
been warned that the PRC would intervene if UN forces crossed the 38th parallel. 
And Nehru’s government thought a UN move into North Korea entailed an 
unacceptable risk of escalation. It proved to be a significant piece of foresight. 
 
Limited Chinese Intervention 
On 6 November 1950, with UN forces approaching the Chinese border, the 
Security Council received a special report from MacArthur stating that ‘hostile 
contact’ had been made ‘with Chinese communist military units’.8 While this 
news came as a great shock to the international community, the American 
response was moderate. US Secretary of State Dean Acheson formulated a draft 
resolution, which simply called on the Chinese forces to cease their activities in 
                                                 
8 United Nations Security Council Official Records (UNSC) Fifth Year Supplement for 
September through December, S/1884, 6 Nov. 1950 
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Korea and withdraw to allow the UN Command to complete the unification of 
Korea.9  
The British Delegation immediately agreed to co-sponsor this proposal 
along with four other members of the Security Council. But divergence between 
the Commonwealth and the USA had already began to surface. The British 
Permanent Representative Gladwyn Jebb, with the support of Rau, insisted that as 
a preliminary measure the Security Council invite the PRC to send a 
representative to clarify China’s objectives in Korea.10 Behind this request was 
the belief held by the Commonwealth governments, particularly the UK and India, 
that China might have intervened to protect her interests in the border zone, 
particularly the hydro-electric power stations on the Yalu river. Implicit in this 
conclusion was a sense that the United States was in some way responsible for the 
alarming turn of events. 
When China rebuffed the Anglo-Indian overture, Bevin became alarmed. 
He now feared that the PRC was planning a large-scale invasion of Korea. And to 
head it off he proposed the creation of a buffer zone south of the Korean-Chinese 
border. The Foreign Secretary hoped this would avoid a costly war without having 
to make any significant territorial or political concessions to the Chinese. Even so, 
Bevin grudgingly backed down when the Truman administration revealed it 
would only accept a buffer zone in Manchurian territory.11 Acheson was opposed 
                                                 
9 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1950 Vol.VII, Acheson-US Embassy UK 
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10 UNSC Fifth Year, No.62 – 520th Meeting, New York, 8 Nov. 1950 
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to taking any action that would hinder MacArthur’s forthcoming ‘end-the-war’ 
offensive to reunify the whole of Korea.12 Clearly, Bevin was already more 
willing than Acheson to placate Beijing, which was hardly surprising given that 
the UK had strong economic ties with China through Hong Kong. 
 
Massive Chinese Intervention  
On 24 November 1950 MacArthur launched his “end-the-war” offensive 
confident that neither the PRC nor the USSR would intervene on a large-scale. 
Yet within days his forces had encountered approximately 200,000 Chinese troops 
in northern Korea, and were now in rapid retreat.13  
The Truman Administration’s reaction to this news was emphatic. In the 
UN, the US Permanent Representative Warren Austin openly accused the Chinese 
Communists of committing aggression in Korea and pressed for an immediate 
vote on the Six-Power draft resolution.14 Although nine members voted for this 
resolution, its adoption was blocked by the Soviet veto, forcing the US 
Government to switch debate to the General Assembly.15  
Washington’s decisive response brought all the Commonwealth members 
into play. But rather than meekly follow the US lead, as many had done in the 
summer, this time the Commonwealth swiftly united behind an effort to constrain 
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the Truman Administration and prevent the US Delegation from convincing the 
General Assembly to take precipitate action that might escalate the crisis.  
What united the Commonwealth states was their shared fear that an 
American effort to brand the PRC an aggressor would result in the 
implementation of the UN Charter’s collective security provisions. From the 
Commonwealth perspective, such an outcome would be utterly disastrous. 
Although the various members had different global strategic priorities, none 
relished the prospect of a wider war. The Indians, for instance, feared that another 
global conflagration would create both external and internal threats to their 
recently won independence, while Australia and New Zealand thought that such a 
war would leave them further isolated in the Pacific region. Canada felt more 
secure due to her proximity to the USA and NATO membership but was 
unwilling to increase her military spending or deploy large numbers of troops 
overseas unless this was absolutely essential. And in London, Attlee’s 
government thought that any collective security measures against the PRC would 
divert resources away from Europe, trigger Chinese retaliatory action against 
Hong Kong or Indochina, and drag the USSR into the fight, producing a global 
conflict.  
Determined to restrain the United States, the Commonwealth states 
employed various techniques. Initially, the Indian and British delegations sought 
to find out through General Wu Hsiu-chuan, the Chinese representative in New 
York, whether Beijing had intervened in Korea for aggressive purposes or simply 
to defend its borders. But though Jebb managed to meet once with the Chinese 
representative, Wu simply stressed that the Chinese soldiers in Korea were 
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volunteers and the only peaceful solution was the withdrawal of all US forces 
from the Far East.16 Meanwhile, the Indian Permanent Representative, Benegal 
Rau, was scarcely more effective. Though he got to see Wu on a number of 
occasions, Rau was given no indication that China would support a cease-fire.17  
Stymied here, the Commonwealth players switched their attention to the 
Truman Administration. In early December, in the wake of Truman’s off-the-cuff 
press conference comments that the use of atomic weapons was under constant 
consideration, Attlee flew to Washington to meet with the President. The British 
Prime Minister, desperate to stave off a backbench rebellion, received full support 
from other Commonwealth members to discuss the situation in the Far East.18 But 
he had little joy. Once in Washington Attlee was unable to convince Truman to 
agree to an immediate cease-fire, let alone a commitment to discuss other Far 
Eastern issues, such as China’s admission to the UN or the future of Taiwan after 
the fighting had ceased. Instead, the two leaders simply agreed to back the Six-
Power draft resolution in the General Assembly.19  
After Attlee departed from Washington, the focus shifted back to New 
York. Here the Heads of the Commonwealth delegations were decidedly 
unimpressed with the American stance. Meeting on 6 November, they concluded 
that the Six-Power draft resolution was outdated, divisive, and would be rejected 
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by the PRC. In such circumstances the United States would inevitably press for an 
aggressor resolution, with all that this entailed. The Commonwealth members thus 
launched their most important diplomatic gambit. They all agreed to support the 
British suggestion for a resolution calling for a cease-fire.20  
Nehru, who felt most strongly that a cessation of hostilities should take 
place immediately and was the least concerned with upsetting the Americans, 
took up the mantle. His draft resolution proposed a ceasefire at the 38th parallel, 
the creation of a demilitarized zone, and the prospect of negotiations with the 
PRC on Korea and Taiwan after the cessation of hostilities.21 Although Nehru’s 
draft garnered general support from other Commonwealth members, Acheson 
immediately rejected it. But the Commonwealth’s leverage over the US was 
nevertheless beginning to take hold. Acheson recognized that the UK was 
Washington’s only true global partner, while the other Commonwealth members 
represented its key allies in North America and the Pacific, together with the 
leading voice in the emerging neutral bloc.  
Indeed, Acheson was in a difficult position. His initial instinct was clearly to 
reject Nehru’s draft out of hand, convinced that the West ought to hang tough in 
response to Chinese aggression and acutely aware of the intense domestic political 
pressure to brand it an aggressor. But he also recognized that a united 
Commonwealth was far more difficult to ignore than its constituent members, 
even the UK, when they acted alone. Crucially, therefore, in an effort to maintain 
                                                 
20 PRO FO371/84124, Record of Meeting Heads of Commonwealth Delegations, New 
York, 6 Dec. 1950 
21 PRO PREM8/1405 Part 4, Record Conversation Gordon-Walker-Indian High 
Commissioner UK (Krishna Menon), London, 11 Dec. 1950 
 14 
US-Commonwealth unity, Acheson proposed that the President of the General 
Assembly, along with two people he would designate, be empowered to confer 
with the Unified Command and the PRC to determine the basis for a cease-fire.22  
The Indian Delegation seized upon this opportunity with alacrity. Within 
days it had convinced all 13 Arab-Asian members to co-sponsor a draft resolution 
incorporating Acheson’s proposal for a cease-fire committee. The Heads of the 
Commonwealth delegations wholeheartedly supported this conciliatory first 
step,23 while the US Government, in light of the united Commonwealth position 
and the fact that Acheson had originated the resolution’s provisions, was willing 
to give it priority over the Six-Power draft resolution.24 The Arab-Asian proposal 
was thus adopted with only the Soviet bloc voting in opposition.25 Furthermore, in 
fulfilment of the resolutions provisions President of the General Assembly, 
Nasrollah Entezam of Iran, asked two Commonwealth representatives, Rau of 
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25 UNGA Fifth Session Supplements No.20 (A/1775) Resolution 384 (V) adopted 14 Dec. 
1950 
 15 
India and Pearson of Canada to join him on the Cease-fire Committee.26 The 
Commonwealth thus had a special interest in the work of this newly-formed body. 
In the confusion following massive Chinese intervention, the 
Commonwealth had united against any attempt to push the UN into hasty action. 
Its unity, which was to prove important in exerting leverage over the United 
States, stemmed from a variety of factors. One was the dire nature of the crisis, 
which convinced the Commonwealth governments that any condemnatory action 
taken by the UN against the PRC would inevitably lead to an escalation of the 
conflict. Another was the role of key Commonwealth personalities, who took it 
upon themselves to defuse the situation. For the first time during the Korean 
conflict, therefore, the Commonwealth had coordinated its policy and achieved its 
goals at the UN. 
 
The Cease-fire Committee 
By the second week of December 1950, with the UNC’s reports clearly indicating 
that the Chinese offensive had halted north of the 38th parallel, the 
Commonwealth members optimistically hoped that Bejing had achieved its war 
aims and that a cease-fire could be arranged. But even with the battlefield 
situation apparently improving, the work of the Cease-fire Committee got off to 
an unpromising start. 
Taking advantage of India’s favourable relations with the PRC, Rau was 
able to communicate with Wu on a number of occasions. But again to little effect. 
The Chinese representative unequivocally stated that his Government did not 
                                                 
26 Lester Pearson, Memoirs 1948-1957, 280 
 16 
recognise the ‘illegal’ Cease-fire Committee formed without China’s consent and 
would not negotiate until it was agreed that all foreign forces would be withdrawn 
from Korea; that PRC sovereignty extended over Taiwan; and that the PRC 
admitted to the UN. Wu also revealed that he would be returning to China in a 
matter of days. In response, the Cease-fire Committee sent Wu a letter urging him 
to stay and talk, but even this approach was ignored.27  
The US Government, acting through the Unified Command, had cooperated 
with the Cease-fire Committee in as much as it had revealed its willingness to 
agree to a cease-fire at the 38th parallel.28 But the domestic pressure on Truman to 
adopt a tough stance was mounting. In the middle of December, the President 
declared a state of national emergency paving the way for a massive increase in 
US military production.29 This action only served to heighten tension and further 
jeopardised the work of the Committee. And, to make matters worse, in New 
York the American UN Delegation also snubbed Pearson and Rau, who were 
trying to push for the adoption of a second Arab-Asian draft resolution 
recommending that the representatives of several unnamed governments meet to 
make recommendations for the peaceful settlement of all outstanding Far Eastern 
issues.30 The Cease-fire Committee hoped that such a resolution would convince 
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 17 
the Chinese that the UN was serious about discussing other Far Eastern issues 
following a cease-fire.  
In spite of the toughening American stance, the Cease-fire Committee sent a 
cable to Beijing stating that as soon as a cease-fire had been arranged it still 
planned to proceed with the 12-Power draft resolution.31 But the UN was again 
caught between the two belligerents. And it was not just Washington that was 
reluctant to negotiate. After much delay, Zhou En-lai firmly rejected the Arab-
Asian Resolution arguing that it was meaningless without the 12-Power draft 
resolution.32 With the bargaining position of the two main belligerents as far apart 
as ever, the Committee’s two Commonwealth representatives realised there was 
little hope of brokering a deal through the UN.33 The Cease-fire Committee’s 
report, therefore, made no recommendations.34 
During the Cease-fire Committee’s brief efforts to communicate with both 
sides, the Commonwealth governments remained quiet. With the lull in fighting 
the US Government did not press for any drastic proposals risking escalation and 
so the Commonwealth members saw little need to coordinate their views. 
Moreover, although they disapproved of Truman’s decision to declare a state of 
national emergency, the Commonwealth members appreciated that the Unified 
Command had shown flexibility and had cooperated with the Cease-fire 
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Committee, which was in marked contrast to the PRC’s intransigence. 
Nonetheless, the Commonwealth remained united behind the work of the Cease-
fire Committee and gave much encouragement to Canada and India to persevere 
in their efforts. On a more personal level, Rau and Pearson showed great 
determination and used their connections with both the PRC and USA in their 
attempts to find an acceptable cease-fire. Yet their efforts were not enough to 
bring the positions of the belligerents any closer and the threat to international 
peace continued to ensure that the Commonwealth did not disunite. 
 
The Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference 
Despite disappointment with the failure of the Cease-fire Committee’s efforts, 
battlefield events led to the Commonwealth’s most serious challenge yet to US 
hegemony at the UN. On New Year’s Eve 1950 Chinese forces launched a 
massive offensive south of the 38th parallel. The UNC offered little resistance to 
the Communist advance and MacArthur recommended that the UN forces should 
be withdrawn from the Peninsula.35 The Truman Administration, reacting to the 
public outcry at these developments, demanded that the PRC be branded an 
aggressor or else the UN would lose all credibility. The Commonwealth members 
were equally disturbed by the radical change in nature of the crisis, but they 
believed that the American proposal risked escalating the conflict and alienating 
the Arab-Asian members. The Commonwealth, therefore, called for another 
intermediary step in the hope of convincing the Chinese to accept to a cease-fire. 
Crucially, the US Government again agreed to put its own desires to one side, 
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largely because Acheson believed that Beijing would inevitably reject all UN calls 
for a settlement, giving the Commonwealth members time to ‘return to 
comparative sanity’.36 The Secretary of State was therefore willing to accept a 
limited delay if this proved necessary to have an aggressor resolution adopted by 
an overwhelming majority.  
The Truman Administration, however, underestimated the unity of purpose 
of the Commonwealth in searching for an acceptable intermediary step. Pearson 
and Rau remained at the forefront, using the continued existence of the Cease-fire 
Committee to formulate a statement of cease-fire principles to propose to the 
PRC. These principles were an immediate cease-fire followed by the staged 
withdrawal of all armed forces from Korea; the creation by the UN of machinery 
whereby the Korean people could express themselves freely; interim 
arrangements for the administration of Korea and the maintenance of peace 
pending the establishment of the new Government; and affirmation that the USA, 
UK, USSR, and PRC would seek a peaceful settlement of all outstanding Far 
Eastern issues after the cessation of hostilities.  
More vitally to Commonwealth unity, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ 
Conference, called by Attlee when the crisis had just begun, coincidently opened 
in London on 4 January 1951. For the first time at such a conference the 
government leaders sought to formulate a united policy, and thereby take the 
initiative in the Korean debate. Bevin summed up the sentiment of the 
Commonwealth when he stated in the opening meeting that the nature of the 
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organisation’s membership—spanning the globe and various races as well as 
representing both the Western and neutral camps—meant that it could exert great 
moral influence at the UN and over US policy.37 The Foreign Secretary then 
tabled a memorandum suggesting that a cease-fire occur simultaneously with 
settlement of the Korean question, the admission of the PRC to the UN and for 
Taiwan to come under Beijing’s sovereignty.38 Nonetheless, this proposal met a 
mixed response. Nehru predictably supported the idea of settling all Far Eastern 
issues, arguing that the PRC would accept no other course. St. Laurent, Menzies 
and Holland, however, warned that the US Government would only accept 
political negotiations after a cease-fire had commenced.39 
As a result, St. Laurent, after receiving a number of strongly worded 
telegrams from Pearson, urged his colleagues to support the Cease-fire 
Committee’s principles arguing that they might be acceptable to Washington and 
Beijing but that, if not, their adoption would at least postpone the submission of 
an aggressor resolution. This course won favour with the Australian, New Zealand 
and South African representatives. Nehru, nevertheless, stated that Panikkar had 
informed him that the principles were unacceptable to the PRC and suggested a 
simplified version of Bevin’s plan merely mentioning the resolution of 
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outstanding issues.40 Interestingly, Nehru’s rival Liaquat Ali Khan made a similar 
proposal.41 After this muddled meeting Attlee took it upon himself to send a 
message to Truman stressing that the Commonwealth was principally concerned 
with Washington’s intentions at the UN after the PRC was branded an 
aggressor.42 But the President’s reply was evasive, only stating that the UN should 
not shrink from stating the truth.43 In response, Bevin suggested a resolution 
disapproving of Chinese intervention and calling for Chinese forces to be 
withdrawn and for the Great Powers to meet in order to deal with issues 
threatening world peace. The Commonwealth Prime Ministers tentatively agreed 
to this new proposal44 but Acheson was non-committal.45  
Meanwhile, events beyond the Commonwealth Conference worked to unify 
the Prime Ministers. In New York, at the behest of Rau under instruction from 
Nehru, the Cease-fire Committee sought to revise its cease-fire principles in an 
effort to make them more acceptable to the Chinese. Pearson, wary of Rau’s 
zealous efforts to appease the Chinese and his willingness to overlook the Truman 
Administration’s difficult domestic position, took it upon himself to amend the 
principles. After close consultation with the US Delegation, and taking into 
account the reports he had received from St. Laurent regarding the 
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Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference, Pearson revised the principles so 
that negotiations on other Far Eastern issues would take place ‘as soon as a cease-
fire had been agreed on,’ while also including specific reference to the settlement 
of the questions of Taiwan and Chinese representation.46 
The Truman Administration once more proved willing to compromise, 
despite domestic uproar, and instructed the US Delegation to vote for the cease-
fire principles.47 In light of this development the Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
agreed there was no longer any need to consider an alternative policy since the 
Americans had accepted the moderate cease-fire principles.48 With US-
Commonwealth unity intact, the General Assembly approved the Cease-fire 
Committee’s supplementary report in spite of Soviet warnings that its principles 
were unacceptable.49 
The Chinese New Year’s Offensive had heightened the crisis and led to the 
resumption of the Truman Administration’s demand for the PRC to be branded an 
aggressor. This reaction effectively united the Commonwealth in opposition to 
Washington’s position. Furthermore, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
Conference in London used this opportunity to try to formulate an alternative UN 
policy. The Commonwealth members realised that the very nature of their 
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organisation made it difficult to ignore. The fact that the Truman Administration 
remained silent at the UN for over a week while the Commonwealth leaders 
discussed this matter in isolation dramatically highlights this point, especially as 
the military situation worsened during this time and the American public 
increasingly turned against its government.  
The Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference had, however, also 
demonstrated that its members were not as united as they had hoped. Attlee and 
Bevin were preoccupied with trying to appease Nehru who, in turn, was most 
concerned with placating China. In contrast, St. Laurent, Menzies and Holland 
were more sensitive to the Truman Administration’s desperate domestic position. 
These fissures within the Commonwealth were soon to open into a gaping chasm. 
Yet for the meantime, the Commonwealth was united by the clear-sightedness 
displayed by Pearson and Rau on the Cease-fire Committee and the US 
Government’s continued willingness to meet the Commonwealth’s viewpoint. 
 
The ‘Aggressor’ Resolution 
The Prime Ministers’ Conference represented the pinnacle of Commonwealth 
coordination. After this point in time, the conditions for unity were removed one 
by one during the second half of January 1951. 
 To begin with, the US Government’s willingness to compromise 
evaporated. On the same day as the cease-fire principles were adopted, Acheson, 
predicting that Beijing would reject the peace overture, formulated a draft 
resolution branding the PRC an aggressor and calling for the UN Collective 
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Measures Committee to make recommendations accordingly.50 After 17 January, 
when Zhou En-lai rejected the cease-fire principles, the Truman Administration’s 
patience finally snapped. Although the Chinese Premier did make a counter-
proposal for a conference to be held in China composed of the PRC, USSR, USA, 
UK, France, India and Egypt to negotiate all outstanding Far Eastern issues before 
a cease-fire,  Truman immediately told the press that the US Government would 
seek to brand the PRC an aggressor ‘with everything that we could bring to 
bear.’51 In the General Assembly Austin stressed that the UN had explored every 
possibility for a peaceful settlement; now the time had come to take firm action or 
face ruin.52 In addition, Acheson told the British that the US Government’s 
support for the cease-fire principles had brought it ‘to the verge of destruction 
domestically’ and was unwilling to make any further compromises.53 In New 
York, the US Delegation was instructed to search for sponsors for the aggressor 
resolution, starting with the Commonwealth members, but if none could be found 
then it should table the proposal alone.54 
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Under this pressure the Commonwealth alliance began to splinter. The New 
Zealand and South African governments were the first not to oppose the US draft 
resolution as it stood. The Australian Foreign Minister Percy Spender also 
accepted the American proposal, but suggested that its condemnation paragraph 
be rephrased. And he proposed the establishment of an ad hoc body to use its 
good offices to bring about the cessation of hostilities.55 In contrast, the British 
Cabinet called for the US draft resolution to be divided into two stages, The first 
would condemn the PRC for rejecting a cease-fire; the second would deal with the 
question of additional measures only if the first did not bring about a cessation of 
hostilities.56 The Canadian Government held similar views.57 Nehru, meanwhile, 
was encouraged by the Chinese response and sought further elucidation of 
Beijing’s position before committing to any UN policy.58 
Yet, despite his aggressive posturing, Acheson remained sensitive to 
Commonwealth pressure. And he soon agreed to revise the US draft resolution by 
incorporating the Australian phrasing regarding the condemnation of the PRC, as 
well as adding a provision for the establishment of a Good Offices Committee, 
which would be composed of the President of the General Assembly and two 
persons he would designate to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict.  The US 
Government hoped that the addition of these clauses would allow the 
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Commonwealth governments to co-sponsor the proposal and avoid the 
embarrassment of tabling its draft resolution alone. But Acheson’s ploy was only 
partially successful. Although Australia was a willing co-sponsor, Britain and 
Canada continued to insist that the paragraph referring to additional measures be 
deleted. Under intense pressure from both Houses of Congress, the Truman 
Administration decided to table the revised draft resolution alone.  
Washington’s determination to demonstrate the strength of its convictions 
was not shaken by the arrival of a communication from the Indian Government 
containing a set of ‘clarifications’ to the earlier PRC’s counter-proposal. Zhou En-
lai now suggested certain concessions, including the removal of all conditions 
before negotiations and that the Seven-Power conference would first agree to a 
cease-fire before other Far Eastern issues were resolved.59 But the Truman 
Administration dismissed them as nothing more than Chinese propaganda that 
would delay the work of the UN.  
The US action thoroughly divided the Commonwealth, but not along the 
familiar ‘old’-‘new’ cleavage. On one hand, Bevin and Pearson joined with Nehru 
in concluding that the Chinese proposals were sincere and that a window of 
opportunity had been opened. Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, on the 
other hand, were against opposing the Americans, especially now that 
Washington had clearly signalled that it would stop at nothing less than an 
aggressor resolution. On 22 January Commonwealth disunity was made public 
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when the Indian, British, Canadian and Pakistani delegations supported a motion 
tabled by Rau to have the Korean debate adjourned for 48 hours so that the 
clarifications could be examined. The Australian, New Zealand and South African 
delegations abstained. Notably, in spite of a negative American vote, the motion 
was narrowly adopted by 27 votes to 23 with six abstentions.60 
During the 48-hours adjournment Commonwealth unity disintegrated 
completely. The vote on the Indian motion had exposed the rift within the 
Western alliance and finally brought home to the Commonwealth members that 
they might find themselves voting against a US resolution. In addition, it had 
become increasingly clear to the Commonwealth governments by this time that 
the severity of the crisis had lessened in the preceding weeks. Under the 
operational command of Lieutenant-General Matthew Ridgway the UN forces had 
halted the Chinese offensive and restored confidence that a line could be held 
across the peninsula. In this situation the Truman Administration, with a slight 
easing of public pressure, felt there was no need for the UN to immediately 
impose additional measures upon the PRC while the Commonwealth members no 
longer feared that the conflict would necessarily escalate if China was branded an 
aggressor.  
As a result, the key personalities within each Commonwealth government 
reassessed their positions in light of their long-term relations vis-à-vis 
Washington. With a possible Pacific security pact uppermost in his mind, Spender 
gave the Australian Delegation final instructions to vote in favour of the US draft 
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resolution, despite Menzies’ desire not to diverge from the UK.61 Doidge, equally 
desirous of a US security guarantee for New Zealand, convinced his own Prime 
Minister to fully support the US draft resolution.62 More significantly, Britain and 
Canada started to gravitate back towards the Americans. Pearson recognized that 
if Ottawa wished to maintain its special relationship with Washington it would 
have to vote for the draft resolution. What’s more, even the British Government 
showed the first signs of breaking. With Bevin gravely ill in hospital his more 
cautious deputy, Minister of State Kenneth Younger, warned the Cabinet that if it 
did not support the US draft resolution the UK would become isolated from her 
key allies. Even so, the majority of the Labour Cabinet remained firmly opposed 
to branding the PRC an aggressor and Attlee reluctantly agreed to vote against the 
draft resolution unless the provision concerning additional measures was 
deleted.63 The UK thus found itself standing alone with India against the USA.  
Nehru’s convictions, however, were little affected by concerns of voting 
against the US proposal. In fact, the Indian Prime Minister had become greatly 
disillusioned with the Commonwealth precisely because the majority of its 
members had folded under US pressure at the critical moment. India, therefore, 
turned its attention to the neutral bloc where it continued to hold much sway. Rau 
had consequently been able to persuade the Arab-Asian members to revise their 
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outstanding draft resolution to incorporate the Chinese proposal for a Seven-
Power conference.64  
Yet even though the Commonwealth was thoroughly disunited and the 
majority of its members had endorsed the American position, at the eleventh hour 
the Truman Administration proved willing to make a final concession to avoid a 
split with the UK. While Acheson was pleased to have broken up the united 
Commonwealth front he recognised that the UK represented Washington’s closest 
and most influential ally and was prepared to go one step further to maintain this 
partnership. Moreover, Acheson realised that without British support the Western 
alliance would appear acutely divided even if the other Commonwealth members 
voted for the US draft resolution. The Secretary of State feared the domestic 
response to this act of apparent British insubordination and how Communist 
propaganda would take advantage of the situation. 
Taking all this into account Acheson unwillingly agreed to amend the US 
draft resolution so that the committee for additional measures would defer its 
report if the Good Offices Committee reported satisfactory progress in its work.65 
The British Cabinet, content that they had forced Washington to make a number 
of significant concessions and realising that they could wring no more now the 
Commonwealth was disunited, finally agreed to vote in favour of the aggressor 
resolution to avoid being alienated at the UN.66 
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Meanwhile, India continued to oppose any attempts to condemn the Chinese 
intervention in Korea and in a final effort to win support revised the 12-Power 
draft resolution so that the first action of the proposed Seven-Power conference 
would be to arrange a cease-fire.67 Additionally, Rau informed the General 
Assembly that the Indian Government had received information from the ‘highest 
sources in Peking’ that the Chinese Government regarded the revised 12-Power 
draft resolution as ‘providing a genuine basis for a peaceful settlement’.68 In the 
circumstances, these efforts did not prove enough to reunite the Commonwealth 
or convince the majority of the UN members. When the Arab-Asian proposal was 
put to the vote it was rejected with a large number of members abstaining, 
including all of the Old Commonwealth. In comparison, the US draft resolution 
was overwhelmingly adopted with all the Old Commonwealth members voting in 
its favour, Pakistan abstaining, and India finding itself in opposition with the 
Soviet bloc.69 
Over the following 18 months of the Korean conflict US leadership at the 
UN prevailed while the Commonwealth remained quiet. The Commonwealth 
accepted this passive role because of the relative stability of the conflict, once a 
military stalemate had been established at the 38th parallel and the PRC failed to 
take any retaliatory action. Moreover, the Truman Administration waited patiently 
for the efforts of the Good Offices Committee to peter out and then only pressed 
for an economic embargo on the export of strategic goods to China. When 
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armistice talks commenced between the UNC and Communist High Command in 
July 1951 all of the Commonwealth members were content that the risk of 
escalation was minimal and supported the US Delegation’s motion to have the 
Korean debate postponed until a cease-fire had been arranged. While this was a 
practical measure it also demonstrated Washington’s concern that it could no 
longer expect to dominate discussions in New York with the unquestioned support 
of the Commonwealth. These concerns proved well judged since when the debate 
finally resumed in October 1952 in response to the breakdown of the armistice 
talks the Commonwealth, fearing a prolongation of the conflict and the American 
military response to such an eventuality, once again united in opposition to US 
policy at the UN. In this instance the Commonwealth forced the lame duck 
Truman Administration to back down. 
Nonetheless, in the crisis following Chinese intervention in the Korean War 
the Commonwealth by remaining united had been able to force the US 
Government to make a number of significant concessions that created the delay 
necessary to expose China’s insincerity and bring about the overwhelming 
support of the UN members for the aggressor resolution.70 As William Stueck 
points out, this delay came at a crucial time: had the United States been able to 
push through an aggressor resolution during January, when the battlefield 
situation was so bleak that a UN defeat seemed distinctly possible, then it was 
possible that such a resolution might have been used to give legitimacy to some of 
the escalatory measures the US government briefly considered. But by February 
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the military situation on the ground was already starting to improve. The 
Commonwealth had thus bought some valuable time.71 
Meanwhile, the Old Commonwealth members were generally pleased that 
their challenge to US hegemony at the UN had brought them closer together than 
they had been since the Second World War, and this helped to ensure that the 
Commonwealth remained a significant aspect of their foreign policies for the 
foreseeable future. More importantly, however, the Commonwealth members 
were relieved that this act of resistance, though serious in the short-term, had not 
jeopardised their long-term relations with the Western superpower. In fact, the 
Australian and New Zealand governments believed that the signing of the 
ANZUS defence treaty the following year vindicated their flexible policies during 
this period. For these two countries the heightened state of the Cold War that had 
over the following months had only served to highlight that the Commonwealth, 
particularly the UK, could no longer guarantee their security. As a result, efforts 
to court Washington had been seriously stepped up and Australia and New 
Zealand had been willing to sign a Pacific pact excluding the UK.  
On the debit side, however, for India the adoption of the aggressor 
resolution dented its belief in the Commonwealth as a counterweight to US 
influence. Nehru, therefore, placed his long-term allegiance with the neutral bloc. 
It was a paradoxical consequence of the high-water mark of the Commonwealth’s 
influence on international politics. 
In terms of broader importance this episode demonstrated that the 
Commonwealth was more than a symbolic group of States bound by a common 
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history. When certain conditions were met the Commonwealth could coordinate a 
united position and wield influence over the USA, especially in the multilateral 
environment of the UN. When these conditions were absent and the 
Commonwealth members acted independently none of them, not even the UK, 
could have hoped to constrain US policy to the extent witnessed during the crisis 
following Chinese intervention in the Korean War.  The events that took place at 
the UN over the winter of 1950-51 thus suggest that in the deeply polarised world 
at the height of the Cold War the Commonwealth mattered and its role in 
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